In the classical Hospitals/Residents problem, a stable matching M is sought which ensures that no blocking pair can exist in which a resident r and hospital h can improve relative to M by becoming assigned to each other. Such a situation is undesirable as it could naturally lead to r and h forming a private arrangement outside of the matching. This however assumes that a blocking pair that exists in theory would invariably lead to a matching being undermined in practice. However such a situation need not arise if the lack of social ties between agents prevents an awareness of certain blocking pairs in practice. Relaxing the stability definition to take such a scenario into account can yield larger stable matchings.
Introduction
Matching problems generally involve the assignment of a set (or sets) of agents to one another. Agents in all (or some) of the sets involved may be required to list other agents they find acceptable in order of preference. Agents may also be subject to capacity constraints, indicating the maximum number of assignments they are allowed to be involved in. An example of a matching problem which has received much attention in literature is the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) [9, 10, 20, 24] . An HR instance consists of a set of residents seeking to be matched to a set of hospitals. In this problem each resident forms an acceptable pair with every hospital on his preference list. A matching is a set assignments involving such acceptable pairs that obeys the capacity constraints of the agents involved. An acceptable pair forms a blocking pair with respect to a matching, or blocks a matching, if both agents would rather be assigned to each other than remain with their assignees (if any) in the matching. A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair. Matching problems have a wide range of applications including the assignment of graduating medical students (residents) to hospitals [14, 23] and students to high schools [1, 2] . In applications such as these, it has been convincingly argued that stability is a desirable property of a matching [23] .
Although the concept of stability is important in many applications of matching problems, there are classes of matching problems (such as the Stable Roommates problem) for which an instance is not guaranteed to admit a stable matching [9] . Moreover, enforcing the stability requirement tends to reduce the size of matchings discovered [4] . This is an issue particularly in the case of applications where it is desired to find the largest possible matching. Also, it is generally assumed that a resident-hospital pair that blocks a matching in theory will also block the matching in practice. However this assumption is not always true in some real-life applications, as resident-hospital pairs are more likely to form blocking pairs in practice if social ties exist between them. These factors have motivated studies into alternative, weaker stability definitions that still aim to prevent a given matching from being subverted while increasing the number of agents involved in the matchings.
Arcaute and Vassilvitskii [3] described the Hospitals/Residents problem in the context of assigning job applicants to company positions. They observed that applicants are more likely to be employed by a company if they are recommended by their friends who are already employees of that company. In their model, an applicant-company pair (a, c) may block a matching M if (a, c) blocks it in the traditional sense (as described in the analogous HR context) and a is friends with another applicant a ′ assigned to c in M. Thus their problem incorporates both the traditional HR problem and additionally an underlying social network, represented as an undirected graph consisting of applicants as nodes and edges between nodes where the corresponding applicants have some social ties (e.g., are friends). Matchings that admit no blocking pair in this context are called locally stable due to the addition of the informational constraint on blocking pairs. Cheng and McDermid [6] investigated the problem (which they called HR+SN) further and presented important algorithmic properties and complexity results. They showed that locally stable matchings can be of different sizes and the problem of finding a maximum locally stable matching is NP-hard. They identified special cases where the problem is polynomially solvable and gave upper and lower bounds on the approximability of the problem. Hoefer and Wagner [12, 11] also present similar models of matching problems involving social networks.
While the HR+SN model is quite natural in the job market, it makes an assumption that the employed applicant a ′ will always be willing to make a recommendation. This however may not be the case as a recommendation may in practice lead to a ′ being rejected by his assigned company. Ultimately this may lead to a reassignment for a ′ to a worse company or indeed a ′ may end up unmatched. While it is true that a scenario may arise where these social ties between applicants may lead to a blocking pair of a matching, it is arguably equally likely that social ties between an applicant and the company itself will exist. That is, an applicant need not know another applicant who was employed by the company in order to block a matching; it is enough for him to know any employee in the company (for example the Head of Human Resources). Such a model could also be natural in many applications both within and beyond the job market context.
Based on these ideas, we present a variant of HR called the Hospitals / Residents problem with Free pairs (HRF).
In this model, which we describe in the context of assigning graduating medical residents to hospital positions, we assume that a resident-hospital pair will only form a blocking pair in practice if there exists some social relationship between them. Pairs that do not have such a social tie, may be part of a matching M (given that M is typically constructed by a trusted third party, i.e., a centralised clearinghouse) but will not form a blocking pair with respect to M. Two agents that have such a social relationship are said to form an admissible pair otherwise they form a free pair. As a consequence, although a resident-hospital pair may form a blocking pair in the classical sense, if they are a free pair, they will not form a blocking pair in the HRF context. A matching that admits no blocking pair in this new context is said to be locally stable. We denote the one-to-one variant of HRF as
the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists and Free pairs (SMIF).
This idea has been investigated in the context of the Stable Roommates problem (a non-bipartite generalisation of the Stable Marriage problem) in [5] . Here, the Stable Roommates problem with Free edges (SRF) as introduced was motivated by the observation that, in kidney exchange matching schemes, donors and recipients do not always have full information about others and are more likely to have information only on others in the same transplant centre as them. The problem is defined by the traditional Stable Roommates problem together with a set of free pairs (or edges in the underlying graph). These correspond to pairs of agents in different transplant centres that do not share preference information who may be involved in stable matchings, but cannot block any matching. It is shown in [5] that the problem of determining whether a stable matching exists, given an SRF instance, is NP-complete.
In this paper, we present some algorithmic results relating to the HRF model described above. In Section 2, we present some preliminary definitions and observations. We give a reduction from the HRF to the HR+SN problem in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that MAX HRF the problem of finding a maximum locally stable matching given an HRF instance I is NP-hard even under certain restrictions on the lengths of the preference lists. This result holds even if I is an instance of SMIF. Then in Section 5 we present polynomial-time algorithms for three special cases of MAX HRF. In Section 6, we provide approximability results for MAX HRF including a 3/2-approximation algorithm for the problem. Finally we discuss some interesting open problems in Section 7.
Preliminary definitions and results
An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR), as defined in [9] , contains a set R = {r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n 1 } of residents, a set H = {h 1 , h 2 , ..., h n 2 } of hospitals. Each resident r i ∈ R ranks a subset of H in strict order of preference with each hospital h j ∈ H ranking a subset of R, consisting of those residents who ranked h j , in strict order of preference. Each hospital h j also has a capacity c j ∈ Z + indicating the maximum number of residents that can be assigned to it. A pair (r i , h j ) is called an acceptable pair if h j appears in r i 's preference list. We denote E as the set of all acceptable pairs. A matching M is a set of acceptable pairs such that each resident is assigned to at most one hospital and the number of residents assigned to each hospital does not exceed its capacity. If r i is assigned in M, we denote the hospital assigned to resident r i in M as M(r i ). We denote the set of residents assigned to hospital
A pair (r i , h j ) is said to block a matching M, or form a blocking pair with respect to M, in the classical sense if (i) r i is unmatched in M or prefers h j to M(r i ) and (ii) h j is undersubscribed in M or prefers r i to some resident in M(h j ). A matching that admits no blocking pair is said to be stable.
We define an instance (I, F ) of the Hospitals/Residents Problem with Free pairs (HRF) as consisting of an HR instance I (as defined above) and a set F ⊆ E of free pairs which cannot block any matching. We also define the set of admissible pairs to be A = E\F . A pair (r i , h j ) belongs to A if and only if r i has social ties with h j . An acceptable pair (r i , h j ) locally blocks a matching M, or forms a local blocking pair with respect to M, if (r i , h j ) blocks M in the classical sense in the underlying HR instance I and (r i , h j ) ∈ A. A matching M is said to be locally stable if there exists no local blocking pair with respect to M. If we restrict the hospitals' capacities to 1, we obtain the 
Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists and Free pairs (SMIF).
Obviously every instance of HRF admits a locally stable matching. This is because the underlying HR instance is bound to admit a stable matching [9] which is also locally stable. However locally stable matchings could be larger than stable matchings. Consider the SMIF instance (I, F ) shown in Figure 1 with the admissible pairs underlined. Matchings M 1 = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 )} and M 2 = {(m 2 , w 1 )} are both locally stable in (I, F ) and M 2 is the unique stable matching. Thus an instance of SMIF (and hence HRF) can admit a locally stable matching that is twice the size of a stable matching. Clearly the instance shown in Figure 1 can be replicated to give an arbitrarily large instance with a locally stable matching that is twice the size of a stable matching.
Reduction from HRF to HR+SN
As defined in [3, 6] , an instance (I, G) of the HR+SN problem involves a Hospitals / Residents instance I, defined in [9] , containing a set R = {r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n 1 } of residents, a set H = {h 1 , h 2 , ..., h n 2 } of hospitals, and a graph G describing the social network (SN) of the residents. In the graph G = (V, E ′ ), V = R and an edge {r i , r k } belongs to E ′ if and only if r i and r k have social ties. A pair (r i , h j ) is a local blocking pair with respect to a matching M, or locally blocks M, if (r i , h j ) blocks M in the classical sense and there is some resident r k such that {r i , r k } ∈ E ′ and r k ∈ M(h j ). A matching M is said to be locally stable if there exists no local blocking pair with respect to M. In both the HRF and HR+SN contexts we refer to a resident-complete locally stable matching as one in which all the residents are assigned.
In this section we show the close relationship between the HRF and HR+SN problems. Consider an instance (I, F ) of HRF where I is the underlying HR instance and F is the set of free pairs with A = E\F being the set of admissible pairs. I involves of a set of residents R 0 = {r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n 1 } and a set of hospitals H 0 = {h 1 , h 2 , ..., h n 2 }. We construct an instance (I ′ , G) of HR+SN from (I, F ) as follows: let I ′ consist of a set of residents R = R 0 ∪ R 1 where R 1 = {r n 1 +1 , r n 1 +2 , ..., r n 1 +n 2 }. Every resident r n 1 +j ∈ R 1 has a single entry h j in his preference list. Every resident r i ∈ R 0 has an identical preference list in I ′ as in I. Let I ′ also involve a set of hospitals H, where H = H 0 such that every hospital h j ∈ H has resident r n 1 +j as the first entry in its preference list and has capacity c ′ j = c j + 1. h j 's preference list in I is then appended to r n i +j to yield h j 's preference list in I ′ . To construct G, let the vertices in G correspond to the residents in R and add edge {r i , r n 1 +j } to G if and only if (r i , h j ) ∈ A.
Theorem 1 If M is a locally stable matching in
Proof Suppose M is locally stable in (I, F ). Then no (classical) blocking pair with respect to M in I is contained in A.
) must be a blocking pair with respect to M ′ in I ′ , and (ii) {r, r ′ } ∈ G for some r ′ ∈ M ′ (h). By construction, for every edge in G, one resident is in R 0 and the other in R 1 . If r ∈ R 1 then r cannot form any blocking pair w.r.t M ′ as she is matched to her only choice. If r ∈ R 0 then r ′ = r n 1 +j ∈ R 1 for some j (1 ≤ j ≤ n 2 ), and h = M ′ (r n 1 +j ) = h j . Thus (r, h) ∈ A. By the construction of the preference lists in (I ′ , G), as (r, h) is a (classical) blocking pair of M ′ in I ′ , (r, h) is also a (classical) blocking pair of M in I. Hence (r, h) locally blocks M in (I, F ), a contradiction.
Conversely suppose M ′ is a resident-complete locally stable matching in (I ′ , G). Then there is no blocking pair (r, h) of M ′ in I ′ such that {r, r ′ } ∈ G for some r ′ ∈ R where
Although the converse statement in Lemma 1 places a severe restriction on M ′ (it must be a resident-complete locally stable matching in the HR+SN instance (I ′ , G)), it can be relaxed slightly to the case that M ′ is any locally stable matching in which all the residents r n 1 +j ∈ R 1 are matched. It remains to be shown that a reduction exists from HRF to HR+SN that does not place such a restriction on M ′ .
Hardness of HRF
We now show that MAX SMIF, the problem of finding a maximum locally stable matching given an SMIF instance is NP-hard. Indeed we prove NP-completeness for COM SMIF, the problem of deciding whether there exists a complete locally stable matching in an instance of SMIF. It is obvious that, given a matching M of size k, it can be verified in polynomial time whether M is locally stable thus the problem is in NP . Next we define the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete Lists (SMTI) as a variant of the Stable Marriage problem where men and women are allowed to find each other unacceptable (thus causing incomplete preference lists) and are allowed to be indifferent between agents on their preference list. For example two women may be tied in a given man's preference list. It was shown in [21] that COM SMTI, the problem of deciding whether a complete stable matching exists in an instance of SMTI, is NP-complete even if the ties occur in the residents' lists only and each tie occurs at the tail of some list. An SMTI instance I satisfying these restrictions can be reduced to an SMIF instance (I ′ , F ) in polynomial time such that a matching M is a complete stable matching in I if and only if M is a complete locally stable matching in (I ′ , F ). These observations lead to the following result.
Theorem 2 COM SMIF is NP-complete.
Proof Consider an instance I of SMTI where the ties occur only on the mens' preference lists and each man has one tie which occurs at the end of the list (a tie may be of length 1 for this purpose). We define t(m i ) as the set of women contained in the tie in man m i 's preference list. We can construct an instance (I ′ , F ) of SMIF such that I ′ is the SM instance formed by breaking the ties in I in an arbitrary manner. Let F = m i ∈U t(m i ) and A = E\F where U is the set of all men in I and E is the set of acceptable manwoman pairs in I. We claim that a matching M is a complete stable matching in I if and only if M is a complete locally stable matching in (I ′ , F ). Suppose M is a complete stable matching in I. Suppose also that M is not locally stable in (I ′ , F ). Then there exists some pair (m i , w j ) ∈ A that locally blocks M in (I ′ , F ). Since (m i , w j ) ∈ A, w j / ∈ t(m i ). Thus m i prefers w j to M(m i ) in I. Also w j prefers m i to M(w j ) since there are no ties in w j 's preference list. Thus (m i , w j ) blocks M in I, a contradiction to our initial assumption.
Conversely, suppose M is a complete locally stable matching in (I ′ , F ). Suppose also that M is not stable in I. Then there exists some pair (m i , w j ) that blocks
. w j has the same preference list in I and (I ′ , F ). So (m i , w j ) ∈ A and thus the pair locally blocks M in (I ′ , F ), a contradiction to our initial assumption.
As discussed in [15] , some centralised matching schemes usually require the agents in one or more sets to have preference lists bounded in length by some small integer. For example, until recently, in the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (the centralised clearinghouse for matching medical residents in Scotland) [14] , medical graduates were required to rank only 6 hospitals in their preference lists. We denote by (p, q)-MAX HRF the problem of finding a maximum locally stable matching in an HRF instance where each resident is allowed to rank at most p hospitals and each hospital at most q residents. We set p = ∞ and q = ∞ to represent instances where the residents and hospitals respectively are allowed to have unbounded-length preference lists. Analogously we may obtain the definition of (p, q)-COM HRF, (p, q)-MAX SMIF and (p, q)-COM SMIF from COM HRF, MAX SMIF and COM SMIF respectively. It turns out that (p, q)-COM SMIF is NP-complete even for small values of p and q.
Theorem 3 (3,3)-COM SMIF is NP-complete.
Proof We prove this by inspecting the hardness result described for the (3, 3)-COM SMTI problem by Irving et al. [15] . They showed that (3, 3)-COM SMTI, the problem of finding a complete stable matching in an instance of SMTI where each preference list is of length at most 3, is NP-complete using a reduction from a variant of the SAT problem.
By inspecting the instance I of SMTI, constructed in the proof, we observe that all the ties appear on the women's side of the instance and appear at the ends of the preference list. We have shown in Theorem 2 that an instance I of SMTI in this form can be reduced in polynomial time to an instance (I ′ , F ) of SMIF such that a matching M is a complete stable matching in I if and only if M is a complete locally stable matching in (I ′ , F ). We conclude that (3, 3)-COM SMIF is also NP-complete.
Some special cases of HRF
Given the hardness results obtained for the problem of finding a maximum or complete locally stable matching in a general HRF instance, the need arises to investigate special cases of the problem that are tractable. This section describes some polynomial-time solvability results for three special cases of HRF. Subsection 5.1 gives a polynomialtime algorithm for finding a maximum locally stable matching given an instance of (2, ∞)−MAX SMIF. In Subsection 5.2 we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for MAX HRF in the case where there is a constant number of free pairs and in Subsection 5.3 we consider the case where the number of admissible pairs is also constant, again providing a polynomial time-algorithm for MAX HRF in that context.
(2, ∞)-MAX SMIF
Given an SMIF instance (I, F ), where the men are allowed to have at most two women in their preference lists and each woman is allowed to have an unbounded-length preference list, we show that a maximum locally stable matching can be found in polynomial time.
We make slight modifications to the algorithm used to find a maximum stable matching in a (2, ∞)-MAX SMTI (the problem of finding a maximum stable matching given an SMTI instance where men are allowed to ave at most two women on their preference list) instance described in [15] . The resulting algorithm, which we call (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg, is broken down into 3 phases. In Phase 1, some pairs that cannot be involved in any locally stable matching in (I, F ) are deleted from the instance. A pair (m i , w j ) is deleted by removing m i from w j 's preference list and vice versa. We call the resulting preference lists the reduced preference lists. For each man m i , if the first woman w j on m i 's preference list satisfies (m i , w j ) ∈ A, we delete all pairs (m k , w j ) for all successors m k of m i on w j 's preference list. (m k , w j ) cannot be involved in any locally stable matching as (m i , w j ) will locally block any matching they were involved in.
In Phase 2, we construct a weighted bipartite graph G from the SM instance I. This is done by representing the men and women as nodes on the two sides of the graph and adding an edge between a man m i on one side and a woman w j on the other if w j appears on m i 's preference list. The weight placed on the edge will be the position of m i on w j 's preference list (denoted by rank(w j , m i )). Algorithm 2 describes the process. A minimum cost maximum cardinality matching M G in the the resulting bipartite graph is then generated using the algorithm described in [8] .
At this stage it is not guaranteed that the resulting maximum matching M G is locally stable. M G may admit a local blocking pair (m i , w j ), where (m i , w j ) ∈ A, w j is the firstchoice partner of m i , m i is assigned to his second-choice partner w k in M G and w j is unassigned in M G (as we will show later, this the only form of local blocking pair that M G can admit). To remove such blocking pairs, during Phase 3, we assign m i to w j thus making w k unmatched. At this stage, w k may herself be the first-choice woman that forms an admissible pair with some other man in the resulting matching. The process continues until there is no man who is matched to his second-choice woman while forming an admissible pair with his unmatched first-choice woman. Algorithm 1 shows the entire (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg algorithm.
We now show that at the end of this phase, for (2, ∞)−MAX SMIF instances, the matching produced is both locally stable and of maximum size.
Lemma 4 (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg terminates.
Proof It is easy to see that Phases 1 and 2 terminate. For every iteration of Phase 3, one man always improves from his second to his first choice whilst no man obtains a worst partner or becomes unmatched. Since the total number of possible improvements is finite, it is clear the phase is bound to terminate.
Lemma 5 Phase 1 of (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg never deletes a locally stable pair, which is a (man, woman) pair that belongs to some locally stable matching in (I, F ).

Algorithm 1 (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg
1: /* Phase 1 */ 2: while some man m i has a first-choice woman w j such that (m i , w j ) ∈ A do 3: for each successor m k of m i on w j 's list do 4: delete the pair (m k , w j ); 5: end for 6: end while 7: /* Phase 2 */ 8: G := buildGraph(); 9: M G := minimum weight maximum matching in G; 10: /* Phase 3 */ 11: M := M G ; 12: while there exists a man m i who is matched to his second-choice woman w k and his first-choice w j is an unmatched woman such that (m i , w j ) ∈ A do 13: for each woman w j on m i 's reduced list do 5:
weight(m i , w j ) := rank(w j , m i ); Proof Suppose pair (m i , w j ) is deleted during some execution E of (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIFalg and (m i , w j ) ∈ M where M is some locally stable matching in (I, F ). Then m i was deleted from w j 's preference list because w j was the first-choice woman of some man m k such that (m k , w j ) ∈ A and w j prefers m k to m i . Therefore (m k , w j ) will locally block M, a contradiction.
Lemma 6 The matching returned by (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg is locally stable in (I, F ).
Proof Suppose the matching M produced by (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg is not locally stable in (I, F ). Then some pair (m i , w j ) ∈ A locally blocks M in I. For this to occur, one of the following cases must arise.
Case (i): m i and w j are unmatched in M. Then m i is unmatched in M G and either w j was initially unmatched in M G or became unmatched due to some operation in Phase 3 of (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg. If w j was initially unmatched in M G then M G could have been increased in size by adding (m i , w j ) thus contradicting the fact that M G is of maximum cardinality. Suppose w j became unmatched due to Phase 3. Let m p 1 denote w j 's partner in M G . During Phase 3, m p 1 must have become assigned to his first-choice woman w q 1 . Suppose w q 1 was unmatched in M G . Then a larger matching can be obtained by augmenting M G along the path (m i , w j ), (w j , m p 1 ), (m p 1 , w q 1 ) contradicting to the fact that M G is of maximum cardinality. Thus w q 1 must have been assigned in M G and became unmatched during Phase 3 as well. If w q 1 was assigned to m p 2 in M G , m p 2 must have become assigned to his first-choice woman w q 2 during Phase 3. Using a similar argument to that used for w q 1 , we can argue that w q 2 must have been assigned in M G as well. Thus some man moved from w q 2 to his first-choice woman. This process may be continued and at each iteration of Phase 3, some man must strictly improve and no man becomes worse off. Since the possible number of such improvements is finite, there are a finite number of women that can be unmatched in this way in Phase 3. Hence at some point, there exists a man m ps , who switches to his first-choice woman w qs and w qs was already unmatched in M G . We can then construct an augmenting path in G of the form (m i , w j ), (w j , m p 1 ), (m p 1 , w q 1 ), (w q 1 , m p 2 ), (m p 2 , w q 2 ) , ..., (m ps , w qs ) which contradicts the fact that M G is of maximum cardinality.
Case
Case (iii): m i is assigned to w k in M and m i prefers w j to w k and w j is unmatched in M. Since m i 's preference list is of length 2, w j is m i 's first-choice and (m i , w j ) ∈ A and so this case satisfies the loop condition in Phase 3 and thus should never arise once Phase 3 has terminated (as it must, by Lemma 4).
Case (iv): m i is assigned to w k in M and m i prefers w j to w k and w j is assigned to m l in M and w j prefers m i to m l . Once again, since m i 's list is of length 2, then w j must be m i 's first-choice and (m i , w j ) ∈ A. Therefore the loop condition of Phase 1 would have ensured that man m l was deleted from w j 's preference list.
Since, by Lemma 5, Phase 1 never deletes a locally stable pair, a maximum locally stable matching must consist of pairs that belong to the reduced lists. Since M G is a maximum matching and Phase 3 never reduces the size of the matching, it follows that the matching produced by the algorithm is of maximum cardinality. Finally since by Lemma 6, the matching produced is a locally stable matching, it follows that the algorithm produces a maximum locally stable matching in (I, F ).
The complexity of the algorithm is dominated by Phase 2. The complexity of the algorithm for finding the minimum cost maximum matching in G = (V, E) is O( |V ||E| log |V |) [8] . Let n = |V | = n 1 + n 2 . Since |E| ≤ 2n 1 = O(n), it follows that (2, ∞)-MAX SMIF has a time complexity of O(n 3/2 log n). We conclude by stating the theorem below.
Theorem 7
Given an instance (I, F ) of (2, ∞)-MAX SMIF, Algorithm (2, ∞)-MAX-SMIF-alg generates a maximum locally stable matching in O(n 3/2 log n) time, where n is the total number of residents and hospitals in (I, F ).
HRF with a constant number of free pairs
It is easy to see that in the special case where the set of free pairs is exactly the set of acceptable pairs in the underlying HR (or SMI) instance, then A = E\F = ∅ and every matching found is a locally stable matching. Also if the instance contains no free pairs (i.e., A = E and F = ∅), then only stable matchings in the classical sense are locally stable. In both these cases, a maximum locally stable matching can be generated in polynomial time. The case may however arise where the number of free pairs is constant. In this case, we show that it is also possible to generate a maximum locally stable matching in polynomial time.
Let (I, F ) be an instance of HRF and let S ⊆ E be a subset of the acceptable pairs in I. We denote I\S as the instance of HR obtained from I by deleting the pairs in S from the preference lists in I. The following proposition plays a key role in establishing the correctness of the algorithm.
Proposition 8 Let (I, F ) be an instance of HRF. Let M be a locally stable matching in (I, F ). Then there exists a set
Conversely, suppose that M is stable in
By considering all subsets F ′ ⊆ F , forming I ′ , finding a stable matching in each such I ′ and keeping a record of the maximum stable matching found, we obtain a maximum locally stable matching in (I, F ). This discussion leads to the following theorem. Proof By considering all subsets F ′ ⊆ F , forming I ′ , finding stable a matching in each such I ′ and keeping a record of the maximum stable matching found, we obtain a maximum locally stable matching in (I, F ′ can be done in O(|E|) time where E is the set of pairs in I. Hence the overall time complexity of the algorithm is O(2 k |E|) which is polynomial with respect to the instance size as k is a constant.
HRF with a constant number of admissible pairs
We now consider the special case of HRF with a constant number of admissible pairs. We show that given an instance (I, F ) of HRF where the set A = E\F is of constant size k, a maximum locally stable matching can be found in polynomial time. Let A = {e 1 , e 2 , ..., e k } where e i represents an acceptable pair (r s i , h t i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ k). A tree T is constructed with all nodes at depth i labelled e i+1 (i ≥ 0). There are left and right branches below e i . Each branch corresponds to a condition placed on r s i or h t i with respect to a matching M. The left branch below e i (i.e., a resident condition branch) corresponds to the condition that r s i is matched in M and prefers his partner to h t i . The right branch below e i (i.e., a hospital condition branch) corresponds to the condition that h t i is fully subscribed in M and has a partner no worse than r s i . Satisfying at least one of these conditions ensures that M admits no blocking pair involving (r s i , h t i ). The tree is constructed in this manner with the nodes at depth k − 1, labelled e k , branching in the same way to dummy leaf nodes e k+1 (not representing acceptable pairs).
A path P from the root node e 1 to a leaf node e k+1 will visit all pairs in A exactly once. Every left branch in P gives a resident condition and every right branch gives a hospital condition. Let R ′ and H ′ be the set of residents and hospitals involved in resident and hospital conditions in P respectively. On a matching M, enforcing all the conditions along P can be achieved by first deleting all pairs from the instance I that could potentially violate these conditions. So if some resident condition along P states that a resident r s i must be matched in M to a hospital he prefers to h t i then r s i 's preference list is truncated starting with h t i . If some hospital condition states that a hospital h t i must be fully subscribed in M and must not be matched to a resident worse than r s i then h t i 's preference list is truncated starting from the resident immediately following r s i . After performing these truncations based on the conditions along P , a new HR instance I ′ is obtained.
Proposition 10 If M is a matching in I ′ that is computed at the leaf node of a path P and all residents in R ′ are matched in M and all hospitals in H ′ are fully subscribed in M then M is a locally stable matching in (I, F ).
Proof Suppose some resident-hospital pair locally blocks M in (I, F ). Then this pair belongs to A so it corresponds to a node e i = (r s i , h t i ) in T for some i (1 ≤ i ≤ k). So in M, either (i) r s i is unmatched or prefers h t i to M(r s i ) and (ii) either h t i is undersubscribed or prefers r s i to M(h t i ). Suppose in T , the left hand branch from e i was chosen when following a path P from the root to a leaf node. Then r s i ∈ R ′ , r s i is matched and by the truncations carried out, r s i has a better partner than h t i , a contradiction. Thus the right hand branch from e i was chosen when following P . Then h t i ∈ H ′ , h t i is fully subscribed and by the truncations h t i has no partner worse than r s i . But (r s i , h t i ) / ∈ M, so h t i has a partner better than r s i , a contradiction.
With I ′ obtained due the truncations carried out by satisfying conditions along a path P from the root node to a leaf node, we then seek to obtain a matching in which all the residents in R ′ are matched and hospitals in H ′ are fully subscribed. For each hospital h j in I ′ , we define a set of clones of h j , {h j,1 , h j,2 , ..., h j,c j }, corresponding to the number of posts c j available in h j . Let H ′′ = {h j,k : h j ∈ H ′ ∧ 1 ≤ k ≤ c j } denote the set of all clones obtained from hospitals in H ′ . We define a bipartite graph G ′ where one set of nodes is represented by the set of residents in I ′ and the other set of nodes is represented by the hospital clones in I ′ . If r i finds h j acceptable in I, we add an edge from r i to h j,q in G ′ for all q (1 ≤ q ≤ c j ). We define a new graph G ′′ containing the same nodes and edges in G ′ with weights placed on the edges. We mark all the nodes representing the residents in R ′ and the hospital clones in H ′′ as red nodes with the remaining nodes uncoloured. We place weights on the edges as follows: (i) an edge between a red node and an uncoloured node is given a weight of 1; (ii) an edge between two red nodes is given weight of 2; (iii) an edge between two uncoloured nodes is given a weight of 0. We then find a maximum weight matching M ′ in the resulting weighted bipartite graph G ′′ . Let wt(M ′ ) denote the weight of a matching (I, F ) . In this case, P is ruled as infeasible and another path is considered, otherwise P is called feasible.
There are 2 k paths from the root node to leaf nodes in the tree T . The following proposition is important to our result.
Proposition 11 There must exist at least one feasible path in T .
Proof Let M be a stable matching in I. Then M is locally stable in (I, F ). Consider each node e i = (r s i , h t i ) in T . If (r s i , h t i ) ∈ M, we branch right at e i . If (r s i , h t i ) / ∈ M, and r s i is matched and has a partner better than h t i , we branch left at e i . If (r s i , h t i ) / ∈ M, and h t i is fully subscribed and has no partner worse than r s i , we branch right at e i . Any other condition would mean that (r s i , h t i ) would block M in I, a contradiction. This process, starting from the root node e 1 , give a feasible path P through T to some leaf node v where, for the set of residents R ′ and hospitals
To generate a maximum locally stable matching M in an instance (I, F ) of HRF, all 2 k paths through T from the root node to leaf nodes are considered with a record kept of the maximum matching M ′′ computed at the leaf node of each feasible path. The desired matching M can then be constructed by letting
Proposition 12 If M is a matching obtained from the process described above, M is a maximum locally stable matching in (I, F).
Proof Proposition 10 shows that M is locally stable in (I, F ). Suppose M ′ is a locally stable matching in (I, F ) such that |M ′ | > |M|. Construct a feasible path P through T from the root node to a leaf node v, branching left or right at each node e i = (r s i , h t i ) as follows. If r s i is matched in M ′ to some hospital better than h t i , branch left. Otherwise as (r s i , h t i ) is not a local blocking pair of M ′ , h t i is fully subscribed in M ′ with no assignee worse than r s i , in which case branch right. As before, construct sets R ′ and H ′ as follows. For every left branch in P involving a resident r s i , add r s i to R ′ and for every right branch in P involving a hospital h t i , add h t i to H ′ . Matching M ′ then satisfies the property that every resident r s i ∈ R ′ is matched in M ′ to a hospital better than h t i and every hospital h t i ∈ H ′ is fully subscribed with residents no worse than r s i . At the leaf node v of P , the algorithm constructs a matching M ′′ which is of maximum cardinality with respect to the restrictions that every resident r s i ∈ R ′ is matched to a hospital better than h t i and every hospital h t i ∈ H ′ is fully subscribed with residents no worse than r s i . Hence |M ′′ | ≥ |M ′ | and since |M ′ | > |M|, it follows that M ′′ contradicts the choice of M as the largest matching taken over all leaf nodes.
The above proposition leads to the following main result of this subsection.
Theorem 13
Given an instance (I, F ) of HRF with |A| = |E\F | = k where k is constant, a maximum locally stable matching can be generated in O(c max m √ n 1 + C) time where n 1 is the number of residents, m is the number of acceptable pairs, c max is the largest capacity of any hospital and C is the total capacity of all the hospitals in the problem instance.
Proof Since |A| = k is constant, the number of leaf nodes (and subsequently the number of paths from the root node to a leaf node) is also constant (2 k ). Performing the truncations imposed by the conditions along a path can be done in O(m) time where m is the number of acceptable pairs in I. The number of nodes n ′ and the number of edges m ′ in G ′ are given by:
where n 1 is the number of residents, n 2 is the number of hospitals, A(h j ) is the set of residents in h j 's preference list, c max is the largest capacity of any hospital and C is the total number of posts in the problem instance. Finding a maximum weight matching in [7] (since the edge weights have O(1) size). Augmenting such a matching to a maximum cardinality matching in [13] . Thus the time complexity of the algorithm is O(c max m √ n 1 + C).
Following the results in Theorems 9 and 13, we conclude this section with the theorem below.
Theorem 14 MAX HRF is in FPT with parameter k, where either k = |F | or k = |A|.
Approximating MAX HRF
As shown in Section 4, MAX HRF is NP-hard. In order to deal with this hardness, polynomial-time approximation algorithms can be developed to generate locally stable matchings with sizes within some factor of the size of a maximum locally stable matching. In this section we present 21/19 − ε lower bound and a 3/2−approximation algorithm for MAX HRF. The lower bound holds even for MAX SMIF as we now demonstrate.
Theorem 15
There is no approximation algorithm for MAX SMIF with performance guarantee of 21/19 − ε for any ε > 0, unless P=NP.
Proof We rely on the result on the NP-hardness of approximating MAX SMTI in [17] . It is shown that there is no approximation algorithm for MAX SMTI with performance guarantee of 21/19 − ε for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. This is true even for instances where ties appear on one side only, each preference list is either strictly ordered or has a single tie of length 2 and ties appear at the end of the preference lists. Thus the same reduction shown in the proof of Theorem 2 can be used to construct an SMIF instance (I, F ) such that a polynomial-time algorithm that approximates MAX SMIF to within a factor of 21/19 − ε would do the same for MAX SMTI.
For the upper bound, we observe that a technique known as cloning may be used to convert an HR instance I into an SMI instance I ′ in polynomial time, such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of stable matchings in I and I ′ has been described in literature [10, 24] . A similar technique can be used to convert an HRF instance to an SMIF instance in polynomial time. Proof Let (I, F ) be an instance of HRF where R = {r 1 , r 2 , ..., r n 1 } is the set of residents and H = {h 1 , h 2 , ..., h n 2 } is the set of hospitals. Let c j be the capacity of hospital h j ∈ H. Assume that F = {(r s i , h t i ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n 3 } is the set of free pairs. We can construct an instance (I ′ , F ′ ) of SMIF as follows. Each resident in (I, F ) corresponds to a man in (I ′ , F ′ ). Each hospital h j ∈ H gives rise to c j women in (I ′ , F ′ ) denoted by h j,1 , h j,2 , ..., h j,c j each of whom has the same preference list as h j in (I ′ , F ′ ) but with a capacity of 1. Each man r i ∈ R starts off with the same preference list in (I ′ , F ′ ) as he has in (I, F ). We then replace each entry on his list by the c j women h j,1 , h j,2 , ..., h j,c j listed in strict order of increasing subscripts. Also if the pair (r s i , h t i ) ∈ F then the pairs (
. Let M be a locally stable matching in (I, F ). We form a matching M ′ in (I ′ , F ′ ) as follows. For each h j ∈ H, let r j,1 , r j,2 , ...r j,x j be the set of residents assigned to h j in M where x j ≤ c j , and k < l implies that h j prefers r j,k to r j,l . Add (r j,k , h 
Clearly M is a locally stable matching in (I, F ) such that |M| = |M ′ |. The complexities stated arise from the fact that I ′ has O(n 1 +C) agents and O(c max m) acceptable man-woman pairs, where C is the total capacity of the hospitals in I.
Due to Theorem 16, an approximation algorithm A for MAX SMIF with performance guarantee c (for some constant c > 0) can be used to obtain an approximation for MAX HRF with the same performance guarantee. This can be done by cloning the HRF instance (I, F ) to an SMIF instance (I ′ , F ′ ) using the technique outlined in the proof of Theorem 16, applying A to (I ′ , F ′ ) to obtain a matching M ′ . This matching can then be transformed to a matching M in (I, F ) such that |M| = |M ′ | (again as in the proof of Theorem 16). Our first upper bound for MAX HRF is an immediate consequence of the fact that any stable matching is at least half the size of a maximum locally stable matching.
Proposition 17 MAX HRF is approximable within a factor of 2.
Proof Let M be a maximum locally stable matching given an instance (I, F ) of SMIF and let M ′ be a stable matching in I. Thus M ′ is a maximal matching in the underlying graph G in I. Hence |M ′ | ≥ β + (G)/2 where β + (G) is the size of a maximum matching in G [19] . Also β + (G) ≥ |M| and so |M ′ | ≥ |M|/2.
We now present a 3/2−approximation algorithm for MAX SMIF. The algorithm relies on the principles outlined in the 3/2-approximation algorithms for the general case of MAX HRT as presented by McDermid [22] and Király [18] . Given an instance (I, F ) of SMIF, the algorithm works by running a modified version of the extended Gale-Shapley algorithm [9] where unmatched men are given a chance to propose again by promoting them on all the preference lists on which they appear.
Consider a woman w j in (I, F ). We denote a free man m i on w j 's preference list as one where (m i , w j ) / ∈ A. We denote an admissible man m i on w j 's preference list as one where (m i , w j ) ∈ A. If a man runs out of women to propose to on his list he is promoted, thus allowing him to propose to the remaining women on his list beginning from the first. A man can only be promoted once during the execution of the algorithm. If a promoted man still remains unmatched after proposing to all the women on his preference list, he is removed from the instance and will not be part of the final matching.
In the Gale-Shapley algorithm a woman w j prefers a man m i to another m k if rank(w j , m i ) < rank(w j , m k ). We define a modified version of the extended GaleShapley algorithm, mod-EXGS, where a woman does not accept or reject proposals from men solely on the basis of their positions on her preference list, but also on the basis of their status as to whether they are free or admissible men on her list or whether they have been promoted. Given two men m i and m k on a woman w j 's preference list, we define the relations ⊳ w j , ⊳ Algorithm 3 approx-SMIF 1: initial matching M = ∅; 2: while some unmatched man with a non-empty preference list exists do 3: call mod-EXGS; 4: for all m i such that m i is unmatched and promoted do 5: remove m i from instance; 6: end for 7: for all m i such that m i is unmatched, unpromoted and has a non-empty preference list do 8: promote m i ; 9: end for 10: end while 11: return the resulting matching M ;
Algorithm 4 mod-EXGS
1: while some man m i is unmatched and still has a woman left on his list do 2: w j =next woman on m i 's list succeeding the last woman to whom he proposed to or the first woman on m i 's list if he has been newly promoted;
if w j is matched in M and m i ≺ wj M (w j ) then
end if 6: if w j is unmatched in M then
if (m i , w j ) ∈ A then 10: for each m l such that rank(w j , m l ) > rank(w j , m i ) do 11: delete (m l , w j ) from instance; 12: end for 13: end if 14: end while Proof Suppose M is not a locally stable matching and some pair (m i , w j ) locally blocks M in (I, F ). Hence (m i , w j ) ∈ A. If w j is unmatched in M then she never received a proposal from m i (as if she did, she will never become unmatched afterwards). This implies that m i must prefer his partner in M to w j as he never proposed to w j . Thus (m i , w j ) cannot locally block M in this case.
On the other hand, suppose w j is matched in M but prefers m i to M(w j ) = m k . Also suppose m i is either unmatched in M or prefers w j to M(m i ). Then m i proposed to w j during the algorithm's execution or (m i , w j ) was deleted. In either case, all successors of m i on w j 's list will be deleted, so (m k , w j ) / ∈ M, a contradiction Lemma 20 During any execution of the algorithm mod-EXGS, if m i proposes to w j and (m i , w j ) ∈ A then w j will never reject m i if rank(w j , m i ) < rank(w j , M(w j )).
Proof This follows from our definition of the ≺ w j relation. Suppose that w j rejects m i for a some man m k and rank(w j , m i ) < rank(w j , m k ). Thus
w m i which in turn implies that rank(w j , m k ) < rank(w j , m i ), a contradiction to our assumption.
The execution of the mod-EXGS algorithm takes O(m) time where m = |E|. These executions can be performed at most 2n 1 times, where n 1 is the number of men, as a man is given at most two chances to propose to the women on his list. Thus the overall time complexity of the algorithm is O(n 1 m). The above results, together with Theorem 16, lead us to state the following theorem concerning the performance guarantee of the algorithm for MAX HRF.
Theorem 21 MAX HRF is approximable within a factor of 3/2.
Proof We prove this result by adopting techniques similar to those used by Iwama et al. [16] and subsequently by Király [18] . We consider alternating paths of odd-length in connected components of the union M ∪ M opt . It is easy to see that, for alternating paths of length greater than 3, the number of edges in M opt is at most 3/2 times the number of edges in M. We now show that alternating paths of length 3 cannot exist in M ∪ M opt .
Consider an alternating path of length 3 (m, w ′ ), (m, w), (m ′ , w) such that (m, w ′ ) ∈ M opt , (m, w) ∈ M and (m ′ , w) ∈ M opt . Since w ′ is unmatched in M, she was never proposed to during the entire execution of the algorithm. So w ′ did not delete any men from her preference list and m is unpromoted (if he had been promoted, he would have proposed to w ′ ). Thus m prefers w to w ′ . Also since m ′ is unmatched in M, either (i) the pair (m ′ , w) was deleted from the instance at some point during the execution of the algorithm or (ii) w rejected m ′ twice during the execution of the algorithm. The following conditions (i) m prefers w to w ′ (ii) w prefers m to m ′ and (iii) (m, w) ∈ A imply that (m, w) will locally block M opt , a contradiction. The instance shown in Figure 2 shows that the 3/2 bound for the algorithm is tight with M opt = {(m 1 , w 3 ), (m 2 , w 1 ), (m 3 , w 2 )} and M = {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 )} irrespective of the order in which proposals are made. Clearly this instance can be replicated to obtain an arbitrarily large SMIF instance for which the performance guarantee is tight.
Open problems
The study of the Hospitals / Residents problem with Free pairs is still at an early stage, and some interesting open problems remain. Firstly it is worth investigating whether an approximation algorithm with performance guarantee better than 3/2 can be designed for MAX HRF and if a lower bound tighter than 21/19 − ε on the approximability of MAX HRF can be found. It may also be interesting to determine whether the set of locally stable matchings in an HRF instance admits any structure similar to that present in the case of stable matchings in HR. Also extending the algorithm for (2, ∞)-MAX SMIF to the HRF case remains open. The HRF model described in this paper does not consider the scenario where ties exist in the preference lists of agents. It remains open to investigate this variant of the problem.
We close by remarking that currently in the HRF context, if (r, h) is a blocking pair of a matching M where h is undersubscribed and (r, h) ∈ F , then (r, h) is not a local blocking pair of M. However it could be argued that information about undersubscribed hospitals would be in the public domain, and hence the local blocking pair definition should not require that r and h have a social tie in this case. It would be interesting to investigate algorithmic aspects of this variant of HRF.
